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Desert Survival: The Evolving Western
Ir~igation District
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1887, the California legislature passed the Wright Act, "an act to
provide for the organization and government of irrigation districts." 1 This
creation of a special governmental district that was empowered to levy
assessment against all the lands within its boundaries presented a novel
approach to water resource development in the Western United States.
The Wright Act sparked much controversy. One opponent termed it
"communism and confiscation under the guise of law." 11
These special districts, generally referred to as irrigation districts; 8 historically played an important role in the development of the West, and
they continue to do so today, even in rapidly urbanizing areas.' Whether
in their present form these districts are appropriate devices to foster and
manage Western water supplies in an era of rapid population growth and
increasing competition for water is an unanswered, and largely unexplored, question.
This comment first discusses the history of irrigation districts, tracing
their evolution through several stages of Western development. The second section details the provisions of the Wright-Bridgeford Act, the original model for irrigation district legislation throughout the West. Modifications of the Act are then highlighted in a discussion of the factors that
molded tlie district structure to better serve the changing needs of district
inhabitants. Two of the recent variations on the district structure, improvement and conservancy districts, are also discussed. Finally, the article discusses some of the powers of the irrigation district as manager of
water resources, and examines the appropriate scope of these powers, in
an urbanizing West.

I. Wright Act, ch. 34, 1887 Cal. Stat. 29, repealed by Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 110,
1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 287.
2. Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 126 (1896) (Argument for Appellees).
3. See, e.g.. J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 141-42 (1961).
4. Id. For statistics on the increase of urban populations in irrigation districts, see Leshy, Irrigation Districts in a Changing West-An Overview, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 345, 364-71.
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EARLY WATER ORGANIZATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL
GOVERNMENTAL DISTRICTS FOR IRRIGATION

Human development in arid lands is directly linked to an organized
method of ensuring a water supply.11 In the Western United States, especially California, Colorado, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and New Mexico, irrigation has been the principal function of water management. Native
American inhabitants sometimes built irrigation systems and the
Spaniards continued to use and improve these systems during their colonial period. 8 Early irrigation organizations developed the available surface
waters and usually delivered the water to lands adjacent to a canal system.7 As the West's population increased, and its agriculture and industry
intensified, additional water supplies were developed. One available source
of water was the capture of seasonal flood flows. 8 Development of this
source, however, required more substantial storage and diversion works.
Moreover, the water often had to be transported over greater distances
and more difficult terrain. 8 To develop these new supplies, water storage
dams and reservoirs were necessary, 10 and irrigation development became
a more expensive process.
Western water law reflects the economic value of water. The water rule
of the West, developed under early mining law, was that the first person
to divert water and put it to a beneficial use, acquired the right to continue such use. 11
This doctrine of "first in time, first in right," 12 or prior appropriation, 18
complemented other incentives to develop water delivery and storage systems by protecting the investments of the diverter of water. 14 These other
incentives were the profits offered by the growing mining and agricultural
industries in the West; 111 however, the storage of water necessary for these
pursuits required substantial investments. 18 Miners and farmers might not

5. See A. MAASS & R. ANDERSON, AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE: CONFLICT, GROWTH AND
JUSTICE IN ARID ENVIRONMENTS I ( 1978).
6. 4 R. SWENSON, WATERS & WATER RIGHTS§ 340 (R. Clark ed. 1970).
7. W. HUTCHINS, H. SELBY & S. VOELKER, IRRIGATION-ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATIONS 94 (U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture Circular No. 934, 1953) [hereinafter cited as Circ. No. 934).
8. E. COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE 22 (1968).
9. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 94.
10. Id.
11. See c. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
2-3 (Legal Study No. I for the National Water Commission, 1972).
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 6.
14. See E. COOPER, supra note 8, at 40-41.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 45.
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have been willing to make these investments in the absence of the usufructuary right in the water that Western law granted the first diverter of
the water. 17 The mining industry usually enjoyed sufficient capital to
finance such expenditures. 18 Farmers, however, were often without access
to such financing and had to resort to cooperative methods of financing. 1•
Solutions for the financial difficulties of building large-scale water
projects took a variety of forms. One of the early types of cooperative
organization was the Utah mutual water users association, a non-profit,
voluntary collaboration of pioneer settlers that worked together to build
canals and reservoirs. 20
The Mormon settlements of Utah exhibited certain unique characteristics. The Mormons had come to Utah not to exploit mineral wealth but to
establish a new promised land. 21 Agriculture was an essential part of that
development. 22 Mormon settlements were governed by a cohesive hierarchical assembly of individuals. 28 The settlements were able to administer
the development of cooperative water projects through the existing church
organization. 114 The cooperative attitude among the settlers facilitated the
financing of the irrigation projects. 211
The Utah mutual water user association consisted of landowners who
individually contributed to the building and operation of the water system

17. See C. MEYERS, supra note 11, at 6.
18. See generally E. COOPER, supra note 8, at 36·40.
19. Id. at 40-45.
20. See A. MAASS & R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 349.
21. Id. at 325.
22. Id. at 332.
23. Id. at 348. The construction of the initial irrigation system was governed by a committee
whose members were elected by the Mormon settlers. Frequently, the oversight committee included
the Mormon bishop of the settlement. Once the system was built, the committee was discharged and
a watermaster elected. When disputes arose, however, the bishops of the church usually guided the
arbitration and voluntary resolution of the problem. If arbitration failed, the irrigators might appeal
to the high council of the Mormon stake, whose decisions were accepted as final. Id.
24. See id. "These institutions controlled the construction, operation and maintenance of the new
settlements' irrigation systems and the adjudication of disputes over their water rights until civil authorities were ready and willing to take over, and where this did not happen, until mutual companies
were organized for ope.rating and maintaining canals." Id.
25. Id. at 334. The irrigation systems built by these early associations were usually small in comparison with development in other states. One reason is each settlement developed its own irrigation
system just large enough to serve the lands of the farmers.
New villages had very little capital to invest in canal construction or other purposes and
they had to become self-sufficient almost immediately . . . . In building the irrigation
systems, the settlers had little more than their own labor to rely on . . .. If, with their
meager resources, the early settlers had attempted to build systems that would irrigate
large tracts of land, they would have failed to keep their small villages alive.
Id. at 332-34.

380

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[ARIZ. ST. L.J.

for their mutual benefit. 28 The success of this system depended upon the
cooperation among the individuals involved. Membership was voluntary
and the associations had no power to compel contribution other than the
church's authority and social pressure. The cohesive nature of the community made these Mormon associations very successful. As non-Mormon
settlers. entered Utah, the cohesiveness of the settlements decreased.
Church-appointed management of the associations was exchanged for secular government, presumably to encourage participation by new non-Mormon settlers. 27 As the population increased, so did the water requirements. Larger water projects were needed, as were correspondingly larger
amounts of money. 28
Financing problems also plagued other types of early water enterprises.
Two types of early enterprises that answered some of the financing
problems were non-profit, cooperative entities and profit motivated private
enterprises. 29 Non-profit cooperatives or mutual water companies, similar
to those in Utah, were voluntary, private organizations of local landowners.80 These companies sought to provide water at cost to members and
other local users. 81 Mutual water companies were usually incorporated
and their powers included the right to issue stock, to mortgage property,
to secure repayment for indebtedness, to acquire water rights and other
property, to levy assessments against corporate stock, to obtain revenue
for corporate domestic purposes, and to collect tolls for the use and delivery of water. 82 In many Western states mutual water companies also had
the power to condemn property for rights-of-way necessary to water
delivery.
The actual water users often held the stock of mutual water companies.88 Capital stock in a mutual water company represented more than a
portion of the corporate assets; it represented a right to service of water as
well. 84 Some shares might be attached to particular tracts of land if the
articles of incorporation, by-laws, or contracts of stockholders considered

26. Id.
27. Id. at 349. "(T]he original system, involving active participation by church authorities, became progressively less viable as population increased . . . . Instead of civil authority, the administrative machinery that evolved was one of voluntary farmer cooperatives-the mutual irrigation companies." Id.
28. See w. HUTCHINS, IRRIGATION DISTRICTS, THEIR ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND FINANCING 44 (U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture Tech. Bull. No. 254 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Bull. No. 254).
29. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 7-12.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Id.
32. Id .. at 18.
33. Id.
34. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 34.
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the right to receive water appurtenant to specific land. When not attached
to a parcel of land the shares could be transferred freely from one shareholder to another. 81
Mutual water companies could issue bonds which were secured by a
mortgage upon the irrigation systems, water rights, and other property of
the company. 88 The lands of the water users themselves did not serve as
security for the bonds except where expressly contracted, and where the
assessments against capital stock could operate as a lien on the land. 87
Mutual water companies rarely issued bonds for initial development because of the lack of security. 88 Promoters who built the system financed
the majority of initial development. These promoters were then reimbursed through the sale of water rights or land to which water stock attached.89 Another method of original financing, used in Utah, was the
labor and capital of the settlers themselves;' 0
Commercial, profit motivated companies were the second major form of
water enterprise. • 1 Early versions of these companies often formed to
speculate on the appreciation of land values and water rights due to the
growing populations of the West. 41
There were three major types of commercial companies.48 The first was
a development or construction company. These companies developed a
water system for the specific purpose of transferring the system to the
water user and then retiring the company." The second type, privatecontract companies, were organized to provide perpetual water service to
selected individuals and purchasers of land who contracted with the company.•11 Private-contract companies were not subject to public utility regulation because they did not hold themselves out to be available to anyone
in a general service area. 46 Public-utility companies were the third type.
These were also created to offer perpetual service, but anyone within their
service area could, to the extent of the available water supply, contract or
rent water from the company. This service to the general public subjected

35. See 4 R. SWENSON, supra note 6, at §§ 342.2, 342.5.
36. See Circ. No. 954, supra note 7, at 31.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 25.
41. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 17.
42. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 10; 4 R. SWENSON, supra note 6, at § 345.1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10-11.
46. Id. at 10 n.8.
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public-utility companies to state utility rate regulation:"
Commercial companies also sold stock; however, stock in a commercial
company represented only a share of the company's assets, not a right to
water service.' 8 Commercial company bonds were secured by a first mortgage on the works to be constructed and by the deposits of the settlers
who purchased contracts for water or lands to which water rights
attached.' 9
Commercial companies earned revenue from payments for the use of
water. The contracts of private-contract companies usually contained
fixed annual charges, designed to cover costs of operating and maintaining
the system. Rates of public-utility commercial companies were subject to
approval by a state utility commission.'10
Both mutual water companies and commercial companies had several
disadvantages. The most important disadvantage was the inability of
these companies to raise large amounts of revenue quickly. Adequate security for irrigation company bonds depended upon the ability of the
lands to produce enough revenue to pay the charges for water service, an
ability which did not materialize until the lands had been developed, irrigated, and brought into production. 111 If settlement of new lands was
·delayed or water rights sales were slow, the obligations of the companies
would fall due before revenues could be raised to meet them. 112
This shortcoming was related to the second problem of both mutual and
commercial companies, the absence of a right to compel membership. 113
The company or association could not compel residents of a watershed
area, who saw no personal benefit in belonging to the company, to contribute. Often the landowners who refused to buy from these companies
were those whose lands were most able to pay because they had independent water sources. 11'
Management problems also confronted these companies. Because a
water company might not represent the major water users in an area,
planning for water use and distribution during times of shortage became
more difficult. The diverging. interests and water needs made management
47. Id. at 10. Public-utility companies and private-contract companies were designed to meet the
needs of a service area permanently. Development companies only undertook initial development of a
water system, ·planning that local residents would later assume control. Id.
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 36.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 37.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 75-76.
54. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 156 (1896); 4 R. SWENSON, supra
note 6, at § 345.1.

1982:377]

DESERT SURVIVAL

383

and planning for community water use increasingly complex. 1111
Commercial development companies because of their temporary and
speculative nature gave commercial companies a bad investment image. 06
Overly optimistic predictions of ·investment returns and water supplies
also impaired revenue raising. 17
Although mutual water companies and commercial companies were
often successful water enterprises, these private water organizations had
difficulties raising the funds necessary to build larger projects. The first
attempt to remedy the financing and management problems of the private
organizations was made in an 1865 Utah Territorial statute that provided
for establishment of special governmental districts, political subdivisions
of the state, upon petition and referendum of a majority of landholders
within the proposed boundaries of the district. 118
The early Utah statute was severely flawed because districts could not
levy assessments against the lands of the district. 18 Thus, this form of
district organization offered no concrete advantage over the mutual water
users associations because it failed to remedy the major disadvantage facing the Utah mutual water associations-the ability to raise revenues by
assessing the land to finance bond payments. 80 Mutual water associations
continue to enjoy a measure of success in Utah, however, because the
associations survived the initial costs of development in smaller areas or
within a single watershed.
The increased desire for larger water projects and the problems of voluntary participation continued to plague water development throughout
the West. In 1887, the California legislature passed the Wright Act.81
This Act, which was substantially amended in 1897 to become the
Wright-Bridgeford Act,81 created a political subdivision of the state with
sufficient power to guarantee the necessary collective contributions to ere-

55. , See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 9.
56. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 36.
57. See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 9.
58. Act of Jan. 20, 1865, 1864-1865 Utah Terr. Acts 58. Popularly elected trustees managed the
districts. Qualified electors included taxpayers, either those who paid "a property tax or land-holders
if a land tax in said district." Id. § 4, 1864-1865 Utah. Terr. Acts 58, 59.
59. See A. MAASS & R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 349.
60. One commentator has stated that organizations formed under the Utah district act have had
in fact a small share in the irrigation achievements of the state and have been generally forgotten in
the communities in which they were organized. The very few that still exist are thought of rather as
mutual companies and are similarly operated. See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 70.
61. Wright Act, ch. 34, 1887 Cal. Stat. 29, repealed by Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 110,
1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 257. Although the Wright Act was officially repealed in 1897, the legislative
replacement, the Wright-Bridgeford Act, continued the general theme of the original Act.
62. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 20500-22977 (West 1956 and Supp. 1982)).
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ate a stronger water organization.

III.

THE WRIGHT-BRIDGEFORD ACT

A.

The Basic Format

The ingredients of the Wright-Bridgeford Act which made it an attractive model for irrigation development were: local control,83 generalized
powers, 84 bonding authority, 611 the power to levy property assessments,88
and, of great future importance, tax exempt status for district property
and bonds. 87
1.

Organization and Local Control

The formation of an irrigation district was initiated by petition to the
county board of supervisors by a majority of holders of title to land susceptible of irrigation from a common source. 88 The Act provided for a
hearing to allow exclusion of lands which would not benefit from irrigation from the same source. 89
The next step in district organization was the formation election. The
Wright-Bridgeford Act defined a qualified elector as anyone eligible to
vote in state general elections and who resided within the proposed district's boundaries. 70 A two-thirds vote was required to establish the district.71 Voters also elected district directors at the organization election. 711
Directors had to be resident landowners of the district. 73
The statute called for partitioning the irrigation district into a number

63. Harding, Background of California Water and Power Problems, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 567
( 1950).
.
64. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 56-59 (equating the powers of the district directors with
the management powers of private and mutual companies).
65. Id. at 77.
66. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
68. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § I, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 254 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE § 20700 (West 1956)).
69. Id. § 2, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 254 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 20845 (West
1956)).
70. Id. § 8, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 256 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 20527 (West
1956)).
71. Id.§ 9, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 256 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE§ 20960 (West 1956)
(amended to provide for simple majority approval)).
72. Id. § 7, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 256 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 20913 (West
1956)).
73. Id. § 26, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 262 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 21100 (West
Supp. 1982)).
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of precincts with directors elected separately from each. 7 ' This system
was designed to maximize local control of districts. 711 To further ensure
local participation and preserve local confidence, the Act required districts
to establish an office and to hold regular and public meetings. 78
2.

Generalized Powers

A second ingredient of the Wright-Bridgeford Act formula was the
grant of generalized powers77 allowing the districts to adapt to changing
conditions. 78 The Act empowered districts to acquire lands by purchase or
eminent domain, appropriate water, and construct reservoirs, canals, and
other water delivery systems. 79 Another important provision gave the district board the power generally to perform all such acts as were necessary
to fully carry out the purposes of the Act. 80 This general grant of powers
closely paralleled the commercial and mutual companies' articles of incorporation and endowed the district with flexibility to operate on a basis
similar to that of a private corporation.
The power to include unwilling landowners, as long as their lands were
susceptible to a common system of irrigation, enabled the districts to develop around property of some assessable value in order to generate sufficient revenues to carry out the purposes of the district. 81 The WrightBridgeford Act specifically provided for the inclusion and assessment of
town lots. 811 The power of the supervisors to include town lots and other
developed property contributed to the initial financial success of many districts. 88 Even if the benefits of irrigation were not direct, the supervisors
had the authority to include town lots if they determined that there would

74. Id. § 6, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 256 (current version at CAL WATER CODE § 20910 (West
1956)).
75. See Harding, supra note 63.
76. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 14, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 257 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE§§ 21377-21403 (West 1956 and Supp. 1982)).
77. Id. § IS, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 258 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 22225-22228
(West 1956 and Supp. 1982)).
78. Although district powers were broad, and vested substantial discretion in the directors, they
were limited to the provision of irrigation. Stimson v. Allesandro Irr. Dist., 135 Cal. 389, 392, 67 P.
496, 498 ( 1902).
79. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § S, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 258 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE§§ 22227, 22456 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982)).
80. Id. § 15, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 258 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 22225 (West
1956)).
81. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 76. The inclusion of already improved land provided
revenue because the undeveloped land had lower assessable value. Id.
82. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 35, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 266 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE§ 25500 (West 1956)).
83. Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 13.
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be some benefits. 84
The statute allowed some flexibility in the management of water. The
district was to apportion water ratably among landowners according to
the ratio of the last assessment of the owner to the whole sum assessed by
the district. 811 The district could divert water only for the ultimate purpose
of the irrigation of lands within its boundaries, 88 and therefore city dwellers could only receive water for agricultural purposes. The statute did allow the assignment of a landowner's apportioned share of water to another landowner. 87
The relationship of the districts to the individual user was, with respect
to water rights, that of a trustor to trustee; i.e., the district held legal title
to the water rights with beneficial title in the owners of the land~. 88
The district board had the power to lease surplus waters of the district
if the lease could be made without increased expenditures. 89 The revenues
generated from the leasing of surplus wafers helped stabilize the financial
position of the districts. By leasing waters, the district put all the water of
the district to full use, maximizing the investments of district bondholders.90
The statute authorized the directors to equitably ration the water
among landholders in times of water shortage. 91 The language of the statute was very broad, allowing the directors to fit the rationing plan to the
locality. 92 To prevent shortages, the board had the authority to construct
anything necessary to provide sufficient water to each landowner for irrigation purposes. 93
To provide additional financial stability, the Act also authorized the

84. See Board of Directors of Modesto Irr. Dist. v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 353, 26 P. 237, 242
(1891). One commentator wrote, "[t)he justification for including town lots, which may themselves
never be irrigated is that some municipalities owe their existence in whole or in part to the success of
surrounding irrigation districts and should consequently be made to share in the districts' upkeep."
Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 65.
85. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 18, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 259 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE § 22250 (West 1956)).
86. Jenison v. Redfield, 149 Cal. 500, 503, 87 P. 62, 64 (1906).
87. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 18, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 259 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE§ 22251 (West 1956)).
88. Merchants Bank v. Escondido Irr. Dist., 144 Cal. 329, 334, 77 P. 937, 939 (1904).
89. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 100, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 285 (current version at CAL
WATER CODE § 22259 (West 1956)).
90. Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 11.
91. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 62, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 259 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE § 22252.1 (West 1956)).
92. See Ellis & DuMars, The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water, 51 NEB. L. REV. 333, 34950 (1978).
93. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 15, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 258 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 22225-22232 (West 1956 and Supp. 1982)).
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imposition of water services fees or tolls in addition or in lieu of assessments.94 Levying tolls for the use of the constructed works, instead of
annual asessments or liens, was one option available to the directors as a
partial or complete substitute for assessments. 96 The district board without statutory limitation could determine the amount of the tolls. Because
the district delivered irrigation water in proportion to the assessment
made, if tolls were levied with assessments, the tolls could only be charged
for the quantities of water greater than the specified amount per unit of
land. 96
3.

Bonding Authority

One of the greatest advantages irrigation districts had over other types
of irrigation enterprises was the ability to issue and market bonds. 97 The
Wright Act enabled private investors who might have otherwise been unable to raise sufficient capital to build large water projects. 98
To issue bonds, directors had to have the express approval of the qualified electors of the district, 99 and could request the superior court to confirm the issuance. 10° Court confirmation was designed to facilitate the sale
of district bonds by reassuring investors. 101
4.

Power to Assess

The power to levy assessments on the real property of the district was

94. Id. § 55, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 273 (current version at CAL WATER CODE § 22280 (West
1956)).
95. Id. The tolls could be collected from all persons using the canal for irrigation and other purposes. A district might choose to require prior payment of tolls rather than rely on annual assessment
collection and lien procedures. One of the main reasons for operating on a toll basis stemmed from
the fact that the distribution of water was tied to the value of the assessment paid, see supra text
accompanying note 85, and therefore higher valued lands were entitled to more water than they could
sometimes use. These landowners could sell the excess amounts, but needy landowners often had no
settled or stable method of determining the amount of excess water available from these sources. If a
district operated on a toll basis alone, the amount of water available to each parcel of land could be
determined solely by the amount of water used. See generally Willard v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 201
Cal. 726, 258 P. 959 ( 1927).
96. W. HUTCHINS, SUMMARY OF IRRIGATION-DISTRICT STATUTES OF WESTERN STATES 79 (U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture Misc. Publ. No. 103, 1931) [hereinafter cited as Misc. Publ. No. 103).
97. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 77.
98. E. CqoPER, supra note 8, at 45.
99. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 30, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 263 (current version at CAL
WATER CODE§ 21933 (West 1956)).
100. Id. § 68, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 276 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 22670 (West
1956)).
IOI. See Board of Directors of Modesto Irr. Dist. v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 338, 26 P. 237, 237
( 1891 ).
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also a significant advantage over other forms of water enterprise. 102 Assessments, as distinguished from general taxes, did not, unless otherwise
required by statute, have to be levied on a uniform and equal basis.1°3 The
Wright-Bridgeford Act provided for two assessments, annual and special.104 The annual assessments, made on the basis of the value of the
property, were designed to meet payments on district bonds. 1011 The annual assessments divided the costs of construction and bond payments
among the landowners of the district in proportion to the value of their
assessed lands. 108 The assessment operated as a lien upon the assessed
lands if payment was not forthcoming. 107 Special assessments could be
levied upon approval by district electors in a special election. 108
5.

Tax Exempt Status

The final major financial advantage of irrigation districts was their exempt status. 109 All property of the irrigation district was exempt from

Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 79.
Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 20.
The words "tax" and "assessment" are often used indiscriminantly to denote the charge
levied by an irrigation district against land. However, court decisions involving the nature of this charge usually distinguish clearly between tax and assessment and in most
cases have held the district charge to be an assessment. This distinction is important in
that assessments for local improvements, which the district charges are usually held to
be, are not subject to constitutional provisions that taxation shall be equal and uniform.
Id. Assessments are based on an estimate of the benefits received. See Houck v. Little River Drainage
Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265 (1915).
104. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, §§ 39, 59, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 267, 274 (current version at
CAL. WATER CODE§§ 25650, 25701 (West 1956)).
105. Id.
106. In theory, this ad valorem assessment was very different from the ordinary assessment which
would have been calculated not according to the value of the land but according to the value of the
benefit received, i.e., the water provided by the district. Since the Wright-Bridgeford Act required
apportionment of water according to the value of lands, however, those who suffered a higher assessment were rewarded with a correspondingly higher allotment of water. See supra note 95.
107. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 40, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 267 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE§ 25925 (West Supp. 1982)).
108. Id. § 59, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 274 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 25701 (West
1956)). Special assessments could be levied for any purpose provided for in the Act and the directors
could at any time call a special assessment election. Id. See, e.g., Imperial Land Co. v. Imperial Irr.
Dist., 173 Cal. 660, 161 P. 113 (1916) (assessment levied for salaries of officers and employees);
Hughson v. Crane, 115 Cal. 404, 414, 47 P. 120, 122 (1896) (the Act was framed on the theory that
the affairs of the district should be conducted on a cash basis; assessments could be levied for salaries,
wages, expenses of management, and also to make bond payments).
In 1911, the statute was liberalized to allow the suspension of the special assessment election, if the
assessment did not exceed 2% of the value of the property in the district or the total sum of $7 5,000.
Four-fifths of the directors had to authorize this variety of assessment. See Act of Apr. 26, 1911, ch.
588, § I, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1111, 1112.
109. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 59-61.
102.
103.
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state, county, or municipal taxation. 110 District property and the interest
on districts bonds were exempt from federal taxation as. well because districts came under the general exemption for the income of states, municipalities, and other subdivisions.m As federal taxation on income has become more substantial throughout the twentieth century, the absence of
federal taxation on district bonds became one of their foremost avantages
over the bonds of other corporations and made it possible for districts to
sell bonds bearing a comparatively low interest rate. 112

B.

Challenging the Wright Act

The most important feature of the original Wright Act was the ability
it granted to a portion of the landowners of a district to incur indebtedness for all the lands of the district. 118 At the time of its passage, however,
many California landholders resented forced membership in districts
which could burden their property with revenue raising assessments. 114
Landowners satisfied with the amounts of water already available to them
organized opposition to the Wright Act. 1111 These groups had satisfied
their water needs through the early appropriation of available water and
the construction of the facilities necessary to irrigate their lands. 118 Consequently, they were unhappy at the prospect of losing their competitive
advantage, as well as being required to help fund the development of new
sources of water for the benefit of other landowners. m They challenged
the constitutionality of the Wright Act. These challenges had the immediate effect of reducing the marketability of irrigation district bonds, slowing the advancement of districts. 118
In the landmark case of Fal/brook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 119 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wright Act, and
helped to establish irrigation districts as a main source of water development in the Western United States. 120 In Fallbrook, a landowner chal-

110. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 66, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 276.
111. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 59. See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a)(I) (1976).
112. See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 5.
113. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 21.
114. See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 71.
115. Id.
116. E. COOPER, supra note 8, at 45.
117. Id.
118. See Bosley, The Effect of a Decree of Confirmation Under the California Irrigation District
law, 7 YALE L.J. 108, 109 (1897-1898).
119. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
120. Id. at 178.
After a lower court found the Wright Act unconstitutional one commentator wrote:
[The decision] was· received with surprise and grief throughout the state of California,
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lenged the sale of her property for nonpayment of an irrigation district
assessment. Her main contention was that the district could levy assessments when the object of the assessment was public in nature and would
only deliver more than an indirect collateral benefit. Benefits must be special, the landowner argued, as well as direct, immediate, and certain. The
plaintiff contended the assessments were made to secure only private
benefits.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. Taking judicial notice of
the arid nature of Western states and the public interest in irrigation, 121
the Court found that assessments levied for the purpose of funding irrigation districts were for public and not private use, and therefore did not
constitute a taking of private property. 122 The Court considered the
financial and structural limitations of both private companies and individual enterprise, and recognized that one of the key elements of success for
a water enterprise was the ability to establish a general scheme of irrigation for all irrigable lands. The Court concluded that the statutory powers
to compel inclusion only implemented what the legislature saw as the
most desirable method of designing a water organization. 123 The Court
held that in areas where the precise measurement of benefits was not possible, the provisions for assessments of all lands were made within the
legitimate boundaries of the legislative power. 124
The Court further found that the forced inclusion provisions met the
requirements of due process because each landowner had an opportunity
to object to inclusion within a proposed district. The opportunity provided
at the hearing on the petition for formation adequately protected the
landowners' rights because by statutory definition, the lands would not be
included unless the lands in some way, directly or indirectly, benefited by
reclamation. 1 H
The Fal/brook case assured the continued development of irrigation
districts throughout the Western United States. 128 One commentator
noted that irrigation districts combined and strengthened the advantages
of both private enterprise water organizations and mutual water compaand in a great measure throughout the entire arid portions of our country. The decision
was appealed to the Supreme Court at Washington, and it is not too much to say its
affirmance would be a profound public calamity.
Note, Constitutional law: Irrigation Districts-Constitutionality of the California Statute Known as
the "Wright Act," 29 AM. L. REV. 915 (1895).
121. Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896).
122. Id. at 162-63.
123. Id. at 161-62.
124. Id. at 176- 77.
125. Id. at 173-74.
126. See E. COOPER, supra note 8, at 45.
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nies. 127 Irrigation districts combined two features critical to the success of
any water organization: local control1 28 and a viable means of securing
financing. 128 The value of the successful development of a formula for a
governmental irrigation district in California has been compared favorably to the 1849 discovery of gold. 180
The Wright Act formula, modified by the Wright-Bridgeford Act, was
rapidly adopted in the seventeen Western states, 181 with some additional
modifications to reflect varying physical conditions, customs, and local experience. The preference of the Federal Bureau of Reclamation to contract with districts because of their power to levy assessments and place
liens on the land also promoted the district formula. 182 In 1917, the California legislature expanded the power of the district directors to contract
with the United States government. 138 Districts were also given the authority to contract with other districts within their state of origin or
outside their state. This power facilitated the joint construction and acquisition of storage dams and main canals. 184

IV.

MODIFICATION OF THE WRIGHT-BRIDGEFORD ACT

Although the California legislature designed the Wright-Bridgeford
Act to improve the financial stability of water enterprises, a large number
of the early districts defaulted. m The main reasons for these failures
were the opposition of large and influential landowners, 188 inclusion in the
districts of nonproductive lands, 187 inadequacy of water supply,1 88 specula-

J27. See Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 74-85.
128. A. MAASS & R. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 366-68.
129. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 77.
130. Henly, The Evolution of Forms of Water Users Organizations in California, 45 CALIF. L.
REV. 665, 667 (1957). "There can be no doubt that the discovery of the legal formula for these
organizations was of infinitely greater value to California than the discovery of gold a generation
before." Id.
131. See Misc. Publ. No . .103, supra note 96, at 2. The last state to adopt the Wright Act
formula was North Dakota in 1917.
132. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 13 n.1 I.
133. Act of May 5, 1917, ch. 160, § I, 1917 Cal. Stat. 243 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 23175-23179 (West 195~)). The 1897 Act gave' the districts power to make any agreement with
the United States government for the joint acquisition or disposition of property. The 1917 amendment gave the district specific powers to cooperate under the Federal Reclamation Act of June 17,
1902. See Note, The Power of California Irrigation Districts to Contract Under Section 9(d) and 9(e)
of the Federal Reclamation Act, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 748, 749 (1950).
134. See Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 114.
135. 2 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES§ 1358 (3d ed. 1911).
J 36. See E. COOPER, supra note 8, at 44-47.
J 37. Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 9.
Inclusion of more land than could be adequately irrigated with the available water supply has been a source of trouble to districts. Remedying such a situation necessarily
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tive exploitation, 189 engineering difficulties, 140 insufficient settlement of
district lands, 141 and lack of concern for the district's economic feasibility
on the part of both promoters and investors. 142
In response to these ·problems, the Wright-Bridgeford Act and its
cousin statutes in the other Western states went through several major
modifications. These revisions included changes in assessment provisions,
voting structure, state supervision, and district authority.

A. Assessments
Among the states that adopted irrigation district statutes there developed three principal methods of assessment: (1) ad valorem rates based on
value of property, (2) uniform rates per acre, and (3) rates based on benefits received. 148 The Wright-Bridgeford Act had provided for assessments
to be made on the basis of the value of the property. 1" Ad valorem assessment resulted in high assessment to owners of valuable lands that had
independent sources of water. This factor may have helped to fuel the
opposition to district formation among existing farming interests. 141 In an
effort to avoid landowner dissatisfaction with district assessments, assessors assigned property a value below its actual fair market value. 148 Moreover, the subsequent apportionment of water according to land valuesm

involves a higher acreage cost than anticipated, either by securing additional supplies of
water for the entire area or by eliminating portions of the district and concentrating all
the water and all the cost on the remaining portions. In some cases this has not been
fatal, but the wide margin allowed in other cases between the early productive value of
the land and the cost of the irrigation system has been sufficient to cause failure.

Id.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. Districts frequently suffered from the profiteering motives of promoters. Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Settlement of sufficient land to provide revenue for district requirements is vital to
the success of any irrigation district. Irrigation enterprises of all types are dependent for
eventual success upon the same thing; but the method of financing an irrigation district
through the disposal of bonds makes the rapid settlement of lands especially important,
for the district is dependent upon its own efforts for money to operate the system and
must in addition provide for interest payments on bonds.

Id.
142.
143.
144.
WATER
145.
146.
147.
WATER

Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 91.
Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 55.
Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 35, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 266 (current version at CAL.
CODE § 25503 (West 1956)).
See E. COOPER, supra note 8, at 45.
See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 24.
Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 18, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 259 (current version at CAL.
CODE§ 22250 (West 1956)).
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froze the relative values of land, because valuable lands remained valuable due to their larger water allotments, while less valuable lands remained less valuable because of their smaller allotments. 148 In an attempt
to help reduce this freezing process the California legislature amended the
Wright-Bridgeford Act in 1909 to exclude all improvements from the valuation of property .148
Dissatisfaction with ad valorem assessments led some states to adopt a
uniform rate per acre assessment. This type of assessment reflected an
attitude or assumption that irrigation districts were in the community's
best interest and involved equal benefits to all lands. 1110 The result was
that each acre bore a share of the burden equal to that of every other
acre. This rigid form of assessment 1111 did not, however, solve the problem
of dealing with lands which already had a sufficient water supply. m
In contrast, assessment on the basis of benefits received seemed to allow
greater flexibility and equity in levying assessments. 1113 Assessments according to benefits were designed to take care of varying local needs and
conditions arising from the installation of irrigation systems. 1114 Utah used
a variation of this form of assessment. The basis of the Utah assessment
was the amount of water allocated to the land. m The directors could,
however, subdivide the district into divisions and assign different values to
the water used within that particular division as compared with another
division of the same district. 1118 Yet no assessment could be levied where
the land could not be irrigated. 1117
In an effort to make assessments more equitable, and to respond to the
increasingly varied uses to which district lands were put, some Western
states' legislatures created improvement districts as subdistricts of irrigation districts. 1118 Assessments in improvement districts reflected the

148. Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 62.
149. Act of Mar. 19, 1909, ch. 303, §I, 1909 Cal. Stat. 461.
150. Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 25.
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 22.
153. Id. at 24.
154. Id.
155. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 30. This is an interesting contrast to the Wright·
Bridgeford Act, which apportioned water on the basis of the assessment. See supra text accompany·
ing note 84.
156. Id. at 59. The ability to peg assessments to the value of water would seem to allow for
greater market influences on water and probably represents the most equitable form of assessment as
it is rigidly tied to the benefit received. But see Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 25 (criticizes the
method as inflexible).
157. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 59.
158. See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 66.

394

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[ARIZ. ST. L.J.

greater costs of providing irrigation water to the subdistrict's lands. 1119
Such greater costs could arise, for example, where additional works were
needed to provide drainage for low lying lands. 160
The model legislation for improvement districts was the 1917 Washington statute. 161 The statute allowed for two types of improvement district
formation; either the district was formed by the petition of landowners
representing a portion of the irrigation district, or by proceedings initiated
by the irrigation district directors themselves. 162 The improvement district
could assess landowners according to the benefits provided, not according
to the value of the lands irrigated. 168 Also, improvement districts could
serve a variety of purposes depending upon the circumstances of the specific area. 164
The basic purposes of the irrigation district assessments were to pay the
principal and interest on district bonds, to make payments to the United
States government where a federal reclamation project was involved, and
to pay maintenance and other current expenses. 1611 Some states authorized

159. Id.
160. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 95, at 107-08.
161. Act of Mar. 16, 1917, ch. 162, § 10, 1917 Wash. Laws 723, 736 (current version at WASH.
REV. CODE § 87.03.480 (1979)).
162. Id. §§ 10, 11, 1917 Wash. Laws 723, 736-38 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE §§
87.03.480, 87.03.480 ( 1979)).
163. Id.§ 13, 1917 Wash. Laws 723, 738-39 (currents version at WASH. REV. CODE§ 87.03.495
( 1979)). When the California Legislature enacted its improvement district statute it also provided for
assessments according to benefits received. Act of May 25, 1927, ch. 748, § 3, 1927 Cal. Stat. 1416,
1416. See Moore v. Thornburg, 208 Cal. 657, 660, 284 P. 218, 220 (1930).
164. The evolution of the California Improvement District statute reflects the ever expanding uses
to which district lands were put. The original California Improvement District statute, enacted in
1927, permitted the creation of an improvement district only where a particular section of an irrigation district required special laterals, ditches, or pipes. Act of May 25, 1927, ch. 748, § 1, 1927 Cal.
Stat. 1416, 1416. In 1929, the Legislature amended the act to permit improvements for domestic
water supply and the acquisition of new distribution works. Act of Apr. 30, 1929, ch. 189, § 1, 1929
Cal. Stat. 343, 343. The 1931 revision of the statute allowed for drainage and weed control. Act of
May 11, 1931, ch. 289, § I, 1931 Cal. Stat. 697, 697. The current statute provides:
Purposes of formation. Land which need not be contiguous may be formed into an
improvement district for one or more of the following:
(a) Irrigation or domestic water service by a system of pumps or conduits or
both.
(b) Drainage or flood control.
(c) Acquisition of existing works incidental to a water distribution system separate from or supplemental to the works of the district.
(d) Change or improvement of the water distribution system of the district.
(e) Maintenance of irrigation works of the district and works for water supply or
drainage or both in or for the improvement district.
(f) Control of weeds in or along conduits.
CAL WATER CODE § 23600 (West 1956).
165. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 60.
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additional uses for revenue derived from assessments, such as for the repayment of the deficiencies of previous years, 168 and the purchase of stock
owned by districts in other water companies. Arizona authorized the levy
of assessments to enable the district to purchase delinquent lands at tax
sales. 187
To preserve the financial integrity of districts, the statutes usually allowed the directors to estimate in advance the amount which it would lose
in a year due to the delinquent payment of assessments by landowners,
and add that to that year's original assessment. 188 Further, statutes empowered districts to sell lands for past due assessments. 189
Amendments to district legislation further bolstered the finances by
permitting districts to generate and sell hydroelectric power. 17° California
provided that the district directors could, in lieu of levying assessments,
use the revenue from the sale of electric power or leases of water for
power generation to meet district obligations. 171 The growth in demand
for electrical power reshaped the allocation of risk by shifting it from the
district landowners to power consumers. 171

B.

Voting Structure

Under the Wright-Bridgeford Act any district resident qualified to vote
in general elections could vote in district elections. 173 Other states adopted
district statutes with narrowed voter eligibility provisions. 174 Several states
required that qualified voters own land within the district; 1711 some states
further narrowed this restriction by permitting only the owners of agricultural land to vote. 178
Some states provided for district voting on an acreage basis, rather than
on a one-person-one-vote basis. 177 There were several variations of acreage
based voting. For example, Colorado provided for one vote per acre. 178

166. Id. at 61-62.
167. Id. at 60.
168. Id. at 62. Districts could, in some states, also require advance payment of tolls, a supplementary source of district revenue. Id. at 79-81.
169. Id. at 69-72.
170. Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 64.
171. Misc. Publ. No. I 03, supra note 96, at 60.
172. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 ( 1981) (White, J., dissenting).
173. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 8, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 256 (current version at CAL.
WATER CooE § 20527 (West 1956)).
174. Misc. Puhl. No. 103, supra note 96, at 14-15.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 15.
178. Id. at 14.
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Utah tied voting to the number of acre feet of water allocated to the
land, 179 and New Mexico used one vote per acre but placed a I 00 vote
ceiling on any single landowner. 180
A separate manner of altering the allocation of political power inside
the district was to limit the power of non-property holding voters to authorize the creation of district indebtedness. 181 For example, in 1897, the
Wright-Bridgeford Act prohibited popularly elected directors to call a
bond election on their own initiative; rather, a bond election petition
needed approval of a majority of the landowners representing a majority
of the value of the lands. 182 The collection of signatures to satisfy this
requirement proved too time-consuming and expensive in very large and
populous districts. 183 The legislature therefore. subsequently modified the
Act to once again permit directors to call elections. 184
The changes in voting structure wrought a major change in the political
accountability of the district officers. The effect was to deny residents of
the district who did not own property, yet were dependent upon district
services, an influential voice in the management of district operations. 1811
The trend toward acreage voting, however, has continued largely
unabated. 188
A corresponding change was often made by statutory amendment of
the qualifications for district directors. Some states merely required that
in ~ddition to being a general elector, a director had to be a resident of
the district. 187 Other states required directors to own land within the
district. 188

Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
181. See id. at 32-50. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
limitations.
179.
180.

182. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 30, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 263 (current version at CAL
WATER CODE§ 21925 (West 1956)).
183.

Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 16.

184. Act of May 16, 1919, ch. 339, § 4, 1919 Cal. Stat. 660, 662 (current version at CAL WATER
CODE§ 21925 (West 1956)). Under this modification directors could in their discretion call a bond
election but were compelled to call an election upon petition by 500 or a majority of the district's
landowners. Id.
185.

See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 16-17.

186. M. GOODALL, V. SULLIVAN & T. DE YOUNG, CALIFORNIA WATER: A NEW POLITICAL
ECONOMY I 0 ( 1978). See also De Young, Governing Special Districts: The Conflict Between Voting
Rights and Property Privileges, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 419, at Table 2.
187.

Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 22-23.

188. Id. The California statute required that district directors, but not district electors, own land
within the district. See id. at 22.

DESERT SURVIVAL

1982:377)
C.

397

Increased State Supervision

Subsequent amendments to. the Wright Act resulted in increased state
supervision of district activities. This increased supervision took the form
of: {l) formation procedures, (2) confirmation proceedings, (3) limitations
on indebtedness, and (4) bond approvals. Apparently, this tightened state
regulation was in response to widespread failure among early districts. 189

1.

Formation Procedures

States altered formation procedures in a number of ways. 19° First, some
states changed the requirements for who could petition for formation,
others varied the number of landowners required for a petition. Some
states altered the land ownership requirements for petitioners.
Several states altered the degree of state regulation of formation procedures.191 Usually the statutes required an investigation by a state official
or review commission into the sufficiency of the proposed district's water
supply. The majority of states provided only for advisory reports; a few
states, however, made approval by the state a prerequisite to formation. 192
If a rep.ort was adverse, some states required a ·dismissal of the petitions
unless three-fourths of the landholders petitioned the state official or supervisory commission. 198 These provisions for countering adverse reports
reconfirmed the basic notion of local district autonomy .194
Most states required a formation electiOn after the petition hearing. 1911
A simple majority was ordinarily sufficient to carry a district election although some states required a three-fifths or two-thirds voter approval. 196
Several states departed from the Wright-Bridgeford Act by allowing for
the exclusion from districts of lands already irrigated. 197 For example, the
Arizona statute allowed the exclusion of lands which had an irrigation
supply for at least twenty-five per cent of their areas. 198

189. See generally Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 65.
190. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 7-8.
191. Id. at 9-10.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 9.
194. See supra note 63.
195. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 10. Kansas required only the order of the county
commissioners. Montana and Wyoming created a district upon the order of the county district court.
Id.
196. Id. New Mexico and Idaho required two-thirds; Oregon, three-fifths. Id. The Texas Water
Improvement District required the consent of a majority of voters in any municipality included in the
district. Id.
197. Id. at 11-13. Several states provided for an equitable assessment credit if lands included
within the district were already ·developed. Id.
198. Act of Mar. 19, 1921, ch. 149, §I, 1921 Ariz. Sess. Laws 323, 325 (current version at ARIZ.
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Utah law provided for substantial state participation in district formation.199 The state water engineer determined the quantity of water available and made allotments to each forty acre tract or a smaller tract if in
independent ownership before a district could be formed. 200 After formation, district directors could not increase this allotment without the consent of the state engineer, nor could the directors decrease the allotment
as long as district indebtedness exceeded two percent of the assessed valuation of the Iands. 201
2.

Confirmation Proceedings

Some state statutes provided for confirmation hearings which were
designed to determine and to confirm the validity of proceedings leading
up to the issuance of bonds. 202 These hearings served to reinforce investor
confidence. 208 In Wyoming, however, the confirmation procedure was used
for a much· more basic purpose. The Wyoming legislature amended the
district statute in 1920 to require the district to file with the court a plan
. of procedure for effecting the purposes of the district. 204 If the court was
dissatisfied, it could order modification of the plan as a condition of confirmation, and thereafter the plan as modified controlled the district until
changed by the court after a hearing upon the petition of the commissioners. In effect, then, the Wyoming statute placed the court in a role similar
to that of a utility commission.
3.

Limits on Indebtedness

Irrigation districts, unlike other water enterprises, were able to secure
their debts by liens on all of their lands. 2011 To protect landowners and to
safeguard against district manager abuse, some states limited the amount
of indebtedness a district could incur. 206 Some states limited district indebtedness to a percentage of the market value of the lands of the dis-

REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-1503 (1956)). Such lands could be admitted on a voluntary basis. Id.
199. See Act of Mar. 18, 1919, ch. 68, § 2, 19!9 Utah Laws 204, 205 (current version at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-7-2 ( i 980)).
200. Id.
201. Id.§ 3, 1919 Utah Laws 204, 206 (current version at UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-7-3 (1980)).
202. Misc. Publ. No. 103, .rnpra note 96, at 50. Some states also provided for confirmation of
assessments, contracts, exclusion of land, or other acts. Id.
203. See Bosley, supra note 118.
204. Act of Jan. 29, 1920, ch. 2, §§ 24-34, 1920 Wyo. Sess. Laws Sp. Sess. 4, 11-14 (current
version at Wvo. STAT.§§ 41-7-305 to -312 (1977)).
205. See. e.g.. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 40, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 267 (current version at
CAL. WATER CODE § 25925 (West Supp. 1982)).
206. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 88-91.
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trict. 207 Other states limited indebtedness to a specific amount per acre. 208
4.

Bond Issues

Despite apparent safeguards, including voter approval and confirmation
proceedings, early districts displayed a high failure rate 209 resulting from
· excessive indebtedness incurred by inexperienced management. 210 The default of one irrigation district had the effect of depressing the entire market.211 By 1911, the market for district bonds was so depressed that the
California Legislature responded by creating a statewide commission to
review and certify district bonds. 212 The objectives of the Commission
were to reduce speculative bond issuance and to revive and stabilize the
bond market. 213
The Commission 214 evaluated the financial status of the irrigation district, as well as the cost and physical feasibility of the proposed bond
issue. 2111 To determine feasibility, the Commission examined the estimated
water supply, water rights, the cost· of construction, and the district's
general financial and managerial fitness. 218 Bonds could not be sold without the Commission approval. m The 1911 Act also sought to improve the
market for irrigation district bonds by designating them as legal investments for all trust, insurance, banking, and state school funds. 218 A ma-

207. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 19, 1921, ch. 149, § I l(b), 1921 Ariz. Sess. Laws 323, 336 (current
version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1804 (1956)).
208. See Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 88.
209. 2 S. WrnL, supra note 135; see also supra note 99-101.
210. See id. See also Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 8-12.
211. See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 34.
212. Act of Dec. 18, 1911, ch. 3, § 6, 1911 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. 3, 5 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE § 20001 (West Supp. 1982)).
213. See 2 S. WIEL, supra note 135. One commentator described the role of the state commission
as an important part of stabilizing the general market for irrigation bonds. See E. COOPER, supra
note 8, at 47.
214. This state Commission was composed of the attorney general, the state engineer, and the
superintendant of banks. See Act of Dec. 18, 1911, ch. 3, § 6, 1911 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. 3, 5. From
1965 until 1971, the Commission consisted of the director of water resources, the attorney general,
the state superintendent of banks, the state treasurer, and three public members appointed by the
Governor. In 1971, the state treasurer took over the duties of this Commission. See CAL. WATER
CODE § 20001 (West Supp. 1982).
215. Id. § 3, 1911 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. 3, 4 (current version at CAL WATER CODE § 20004 (West
Supp. 1982)).
216. Id.§ 5, 1911 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. 3, 5 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE§ 20044 (West
Supp. 1982) ).
217. Id. §§ I, 2, 1911 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. 3, 4. Districts were not authorized to issue bonds in
excess of 60% of the total aggregate market value of all lands, water, water rights, canals, reservoir
sites, and irrigation works of the district. Id. § 3, 1911 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. 3, 4 (current version at
CAL. WATER CODE§ 20050 (West Supp. 1982)).
218. Id. § 8, 1911 Cal. Stat. Ex. Sess. 3, 5-6 (current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 20060
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jority of states adopted a requirement that the bond issues be approved by
a state bond commission/m
State supervision of bond issues also took place in the form of voter
approval. In every state but Montana and Wyoming, district electors had
to authorize bond issues.Ho In all states except California, only landowning electors could approve bond issuance.H 1 Most states required majority
approval to pass a bond issue, but some states had a super-majority
requirement.Hll

D.

Expanding District Functions

The early statutes passed in the states other than California did not
vary significantly from the Wright-Bridgeford Act.Ha Each state legislature usually made several minor changes, however, reflecting adaptations
to local conditions.m For example, several states authorized newly
formed irrigation districts to purchase existing irrigation works from private and mutual water companies,i1 1111 reflecting the substantial irrigation
development that had occurred prior to the enactment of many
statutes.He
As the population and industries within the districts' boundaries became more varied, the changes in the district powers became more dramatic. District powers expanded beyond narrow irrigation functions to include such powers as drainage,H 7 flood control,H8 and the generation and
sale of electrical power. 21118 Electrical power sales created additional revenues for irrigation districts and helped to reduce the costs of supplying
irrigation. 280 In some cases districts used electrical power primarily for
the operation of wells to pump ground water and thus expanded their
water supplies. 281

(West Supp. 1982)).
219. See Misc. Puhl. No. 103, supra note 96, at 32-33.
220. Id. at 33-34. Wyoming and Montana provided for issuance of bonds upon the petition of the
landowners. Id.
221. Id. at 14-15.
222. Id. at 33-34. Idaho, Kansas, Utah, and Nevada required a super-majority. Id.
223. Id. at 26-28.
224. See id. for the particular local variations.
225. Id.
226. See generally Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 11.
227. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE§ 22095 (West 1956).
228. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE§ 22160 (West 1956).
229. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE§ 22115 (West 1956). See also supra text accompanying notes
170-72.
230. See generally Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 64.
231. Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 28.
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To date, modifications of the Wright-Bridgeford Act have empowered
irrigation districts to engage in such disparate functions as establishing
and managing airports and aviation schools,1811 coordinating sewage disposal,233 and providing recreational facilities. 184 These expansions of district
powers indicate that the needs and concerns of the district populace have
changed over the years.
State legislatures have also expressly amended their irrigation district
legislation to expand the purposes for which districts may distribute
water. Originally the Wright-Bridgeford Act had permitted the supply of
water only to irrigate district lands. 111311 Subsequent modifications of district legislation document the historical trend toward districts supplying
water for purposes other than irrigation. In 1917, the California Legislature amended the Act to allow the delivery of water for domestic purposes.188 The statute was further amended in 1935, authorizing districts
to supply water for fire protection and "any other beneficial use." 187

E.

Irrigation Districts Today

Modern irrigation districts differ only slightly from their predecessors.188 Some changes have been made to meet non-agricultural needs,
such as sewage disposal or domestic water service. 189 Other changes permit districts not only to provide for services peripheral or largely unrelated to irrigation, but also to take advantage of their new functions to
preserve or subsidize irrigation uses.a.° For example, districts may have
the ability to apply the revenues obtained from the sale of surplus water
and power to reduce the cost of irrigation. 11141

232. Act of May 13, 1943, ch. 372, 1943 Cal. Stat. 1897, repealed by Act of July 23, 1963, ch.
2132, § 2, 1963 Cal. Stat. 4431.
233. See CAL. WATER CODE§§ 22170-22180 (West Supp. 1982)).
234. Id.§§ 22185-22186 (West Supp. 1982).
235. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 15, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 258; see Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 162 (1896).
236. Act of May 19, 1917, ch. 557, § 8, 1917 Cal. Stat. 751, 758 (current version at CAL. WATER
CODE § 22075 (West 1956)).
237. Act of July 11, 1935, ch. 442, § I, 1935 Cal. Stat. 1488 (current version at CAL. WATER
CODE § 22075 (West 1956)).
238. The current irrigation districts, as discussed in the remainder of this comment, are codified
at: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-1501 to -1866 (1956 & Supp. 1981-1982); CAL. WATER CODE§§
20500-22977 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982); Cow. REV. STAT.§§ 37-41-101 to 37-43-189 (1973 &
Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 539.010-539.783 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 73-9-1 to 73-7-46
(1978 & Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 73-7-1 to 73-7-67 (1980 & Supp. 1981).
239. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
240. See McDowell & Ugone, The Effect of Institutional Setting on Behavior in Public Enterprises: Irrigation Districts in the Western States, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453.
241. See, e.g.. CAL. WATER CODE§§ 25240-25245 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982) (allowing district
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The urbanization of lands within many irrigation districts raises some
question about the future of irrigation districts. Districts may be able to
adapt to changes in land and water uses through the exclusion of lands no
longer susceptible to irrigation, 242 consolidation of districts, 243 and dissolution procedures. 2 " While the institutional framework within which these
changes are made varies from state to state, generally their implementation depends upon action by the district directors. 2411 Most modern district
directors are elected solely by a landholding electorate, and in many
states, landowners with larger estates may have a greater number of
votes. 246 Therefore, although statutory provisions allow for flexibility, any
actual changes in district boundaries or operation will usually reflect landowner interests.
Irrigation districts today are often only one part of a complex water
management system. The individual district's role in that system will vary
according to the involvement of other types of water districts, state administrative bureaucracies, and relevant physical and environmental conditions. 247 Irrigation districts may serve primarily as distribution systems
within a multi-county water conservation district, 248 or evolve into key
suppliers of municipal water and power. 249 Analysis of the role of the

boards to pledge revenues from the sale of water and power to meet bond obligations); CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 25400-25403 (West Supp. I 982)(providing for Revenue Improvement Districts whose only
source of revenue is water charges); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1578( I0), ( 16) (permitting directors to establish tolls for water and electrical power to apply surplus revenues to the liquidation of district debt); cf N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 73-12-1 to 73-12-57 (1978) (providing for Electrical
Irrigation Districts which can sell power not necessary for pumping water, and apply revenues to
defray the annual assessments on district lands).
242. See, e.g.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-1545 to -1553 (1956); CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 56436
(West Supp. 1982); Cow. REV. STAT.§§ 37-41-142 to 37-41-148, 37-42-133 to 37-42-134, §§ 3743-119 to 37-43-121 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 539.708 to 539.748 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§
73-9-37 to 73-9-52 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 73-7-29 to 73-7-44 (1980).
243. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 56172, §§ 56380-56388 (West 1956 & Supp. 1982).
244. See, e.g.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-1554 (Supp. 1981-1982); CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 56173
(West Supp. 1982).
245. See, e.g .. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1545 (1956), which provides for exclusion upon a
determination by the board of directors that the lands are "alkaline, slick, unsusceptible of economic
leveling, water-logged, caliche, hard pan or otherwise unproductive or incapable of carrying their
proportionate district liabilities." Id. The second method may be inappropriate today where the lands
are susceptible to municipal or industrial uses.
246. See. e.g.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-1641 (1956) (providing for one vote per acre, up to
160 acres).
247. See generally K. DE CooK, J. EMEL, S. MACK, & M. BRADLEY, WATER SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS IN ARIZONA (Water Resources Research Center, College of Earth Sciences; Univ. of Arizona, 1978) [hereinafter cited as K. DE CooK).
248. See infra note 31 O.
249. For example, the Lake Havasu Irrigation District, in northwest Arizona, provides water for
domestic purposes and a golf course only. See K. DE COOK, supra note 247, at 43-45. But see City of
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modern irrigation district requires an examination of several different
forms of special water districts.
I.

Improvement Districts

District residents initially formed improvement districts as sub-districts
designed to meet specialized needs within the larger Irrigation District.Ho
Arizona has developed a unique form of improvement district called the
Agricultural Improvement and Power District (AIPD) of which the Salt
River Project is the only example. 2111
The AIPD varies from the general Arizona irrigation district in several
ways. First, voting for AIPD directors is based upon one vote per acre,
with fractionalized acreage voting. 2112 Second, the purposes of the AIPD
encompass both the sale of power and the sale of surplus water to reduce
the costs of irrigation within the district.Ha Third, the purposes of the
AIPD include financing or refinancing the debt of any private or public
agency which is incurred in the construction, maintenance, improvement,
or replacement of the irrigation and power works. 2114 Fourth, the district
can be formed only within a federal reclamation project. 2 H
Recent amendments to the AIPD Act give the Salt River Project the
power to develop a variety of forms of energy to ensure a supply of electricity to district customers, 2 &e and the power to issue revenue bonds. 1117
Because these revenue bonds are secured by the revenues of the district,
they in no way create an obligation on district lands.He

Scottsdale v. McDowell Mountain Irr. and Drainage Dist., 107 Ariz. 117, 483 P.2d 532 (1971) (holding that a petition to organize an irrigation district must state that the purpose of the district is to
irrigate agricultural lands).
250. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
251. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-901 to -1047 (1956). This statute provides for acreage-based
voting and no ad valorem assessment in the AlPD, and was amended in response to lobbying by
members of the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association in 1936. Stipulated Statement of Facts
26, Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Stipulated Statement of Facts); see
generally c. SMITH, THE SALT RIVER PROJECT-A CASE STUDY IN CULTURAL ADAPTATION TO AN
URBANIZING ECONOMY (1972).
252. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-983 (1956 & Supp. 1981-1982).
253. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-903 (1956).
254. Id. This provision allowed the District to contract with the Salt River Valley Water Users'
Association to satisfy the Association's obligations by allowing those obligations to become the District's debt. Stipulated Statement of Facts, supra note 251, at 26-27.
255. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-935 (Supp. 1981-1982).
256. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-935 (Supp. 1981-1982). The AlPD serves approximately
240,000 electric customers. During 1974, revenue from the sale of electricity accounted for 98% of
total district revenues of $168,057,000. Stipulated Statement of Facts, supra note 251, at 36.
257. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-1061 to -1075 (Supp. 1981-1982).
258. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-1065(C) (Supp. 1981-1982). Although the Supreme Court in
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 ( 1981 ), found that this fact was not controlling in reviewing the district's
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The AIPD is an example of a form of special district which has a large
role as a manager of both agricultural and municipal water. 1119 The dis.trict statute permits the AIPD to contract with municipalities, counties,
political subdivisions, persons, corporations, or the United States government to arrange for these entities to be agents for the management of
water or works under their control.Ho As land use has shifted from agriculture to urban uses, several cities have contracted to pay the district
past and future assessments on certain lands within their boundaries. 181 In
return, the district delivers the water appropriated to those lands directly
to these cities in its capacity as the landowners' agent.Ha The district provides water to eight cities for municipal use; in five of these cities, over
fifty percent of the municipal water is supplied by the district. 183
The AIPD also has several arrangements with smaller irrigation districts to provide drainage for waterlogged lands within the AIPD. 984 In
exchange, these irrigation districts receive the pumped water, much of
which is derived from reclamation project water without payment to the
AIPD or the federal government.Ha
As the AIPD's water functions have grown more complex and diverse,
the Arizona Legislature has amended the statute to provide additional
safeguards to the landowners of the district. For example, the statute prohibits construing the contracts to modify or affect the rights of any landowner in the district to the use of water for irrigation of land within the
district.H8 Further, the District may veto a transfer of water within wa-

acreage-based voting scheme under the equal protection clause, as a matter of legislative policymaking this raises some doubt about the continued necessity for acreage-based voting because the liability
of the district is now almost wholly on the power customers to pay rates sufficient to meet the obligations of the district. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4S-1068 (Supp. 1981-1982).
The AIPD is not subject to service and rate regulation by the Arizona Corporation Commission.
City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Ag. Imp. and Power Dist., 92 Ariz. 91, J7J P.2d 722, appeal
dismissed, J72 U.S. 704 (1962). To issue revenue bonds, however, the District must secure Arizona
Corporation Commission approval under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4S-106S(B) (Supp. 1981-1982).
2S9. The District provides water to 2J8,269.9 assessed acres of land. In I 97S, I 24,4S2 of these
acres were agricultural, while llJ,812 were urban; in 19J7, 229,460 were agricultural and IJ,SOO
urban. Stipulated Statement of Facts, supra note 2SI, at J6, 4S.
260. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4S-9J6 (Supp. 1981-1982).
261. Contract between Salt River Valley Water Users' Association and the City of Phoenix (Jan.
I, I 9S2); Contract between Salt River Valley Water Users' Association and the City of Tempe (Jan.
I, 1964) (on file at Arizona State law Journal).
262. Adams v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Association, SJ Ariz. J74, J88, 89 P.2d 1060,
1066-67 (19J9).
26J. Stipulated Statement of Facts, supra note 2SI, at JS.
264. See C. SMITH, supra note 2SI, at 28-29.
26S. Id. See also Comment, Reclamation Subsidies and Their Present Impact, 1982 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 499.
266. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4S-9J6(c) (Supp. 1981-1982).

1982:377]

DESERT SURVIVAL

405

tersheds where it owns water rights. 267 This gives AIPD directors authority to control water use both within and without the district. 268
2.

Water Conservancy Districts

Water conservancy districts are a second variation on the basic irrigation district format. 269 Legislatures designed conservancy districts to facilitate the construction and financing of larger, more costly water diversion,
storage, and delivery systems. These systems were needed not only to pro. vide supplementary irrigation water for irrigation, but also to meet burgeoning municipal and industrial water requirements. 27 ° Conservancy districts are also designed to promote water conservation through
stabilization of water flow in streams and increased return flow to these
streams. 271
The creation of water conservancy districts represents more than just
an effort to supply municipal water. It also represents a departure from
the irrigation district's traditional pattern of special assessments for special benefits. 272 Conservancy districts have a split level financing structure. They levy a general tax on all real and personal property within the
district, and special assessments on municipalities, individuals, water companies and irrigation districts which contract for conservancy district
water. 273 The district's general taxes, levied upon all district lands, pay for
the expenses of the organization, for surveys and plans, and for construction, operation and maintenance in the district. 274 The assessments levied
by conservancy districts fall upon three separate classes of beneficiaries:
municipalities, 2 n public corporations276 and landowners. 277 These entities

267. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-172 (Supp. 1981-1982).
268. See infra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
269. The first statute to provide for such a district was the Metropolitan Water District Act, ch.
429, 1927 Cal. Stat. 694 (current version at CAL WATER CODE § 71000 (West 1956)). This and
other similar statutes were adopted in response to the need for an entity which would contract with
the United States Government to construct reclamation projects too large for any one city to undertake alone. See Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 534 (Utah 1935). Such acts are not discussed
further in this Comment because of their primarily municipal functions. This section will focus primarily on the Colorado Water Conservancy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-101 to 37-45-152
(1973) and similar statutes which have been enacted in Utah, New Mexico, and Nevada. See NEV.
REV. STAT.§§ 541.010 to 541.420 (1981), N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 73-14-1 to 73-18-43 (1978), and
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-9-1 to 73-9-43 ( 1980). For a discussion of Arizona Water Conservation
District see infra notes 298-311 and accompanying text.
270. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-102 (1973).
271. Id.
272. See supra notes I 02-08 and accompanying text.
273. Kelly, Water Conservancy Districts, 22 RocK Y MTN. L. REV. 432, 442-44 ( 1949-1950).
274. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-45-122 (1973).
275. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-45-123 (1973).
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must pay their assessment in addition to their general taxes. 278
The conservancy district formation and management provisions vary
from those of basic irrigation districts. Districts with assessed land values
of $20 million or more are subject to somewhat different formation rules
than are districts with assessed values of under $20 million. 278 In either
case, however, formation petitions must have the endorsement of both
owners of irrigated lands and landowners from each city or town to be
incorporated in the district. 180 If a municipality with a population of over
25,000 persons is to be incorporated, the express consent of the municipality's governing body must accompany the petition. 981
The landowners file their petition in the district court of any county in
which all or part of the proposed district lands lie. 181 The court must determine if the formation petition satisfies the statutory requirements; if so,
and if no landowners protest, the court must declare the district
formed. 188 If a sufficient number of landowners file a petition of protest,
however, the court must order an election on the question of formation.m
The court that establishes the district appoints its directors. 1811 All district
directors must reside in, or own land within the district. 188
The board of directors of a water conservancy district enjoys broad

276. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37·45-124 (1973). In Colorado, counties, cities, irrigation districts, and
all other governmental agencies empowered to levy taxes or assessments are public corporations.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45·103 (1973).
277. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37.45.125 (1973).
278. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37·45-122 (1973 & Supp. 1981).
279. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-109 (1973 & Supp. 1981). Proposed districts in which the as·
sessed valuation of the improved irrigated lands exceeds $20,000,000 require the signatures of: (I)
1500 owners of irrigated lands within the boundaries of the proposed district but not inside the limits
of any incorporated city or town; also these irrigated lands must e~ch represent ownership of $2,000
in assessed valuation; and (2) the signatures of 500 non-irrigated landowners within an incorporated
town or city, representing assessed valuations of at least $1,000 each.
Proposed districts of less than $20,000,000 assessed valuation require the signatures of (I) 25% of
the owners of irrigated lands, exceeding $1,000 in assessed valuation and not lying within the bounda·
ries of any incorporated city or town to be included in the p.roposed district, and (2) the signatures of
at least 5% of the non-irrigated landowners within an incorporated city or town. These lands must
have a minimum of $1,000 assessed valuation. Id.
280. Id. An alternative procedure, available for any proposed district, is to file a petition approved
by 10% of the proposed district's electors, or 200 electors, whichever is less. If such a petition is filed,
however, a formation election is necessary. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. §§ 37.45. 109, 37-45· I I I (2) ( 1973).
283. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-112 (1973 and Supp. 1981).
284. Id.
285. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45·114 (1973). Upon petition of 15% of the district's taxpaying
electors, a board vacancy may be filled by election rather than court appointment. Id.
286. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45·118, 37-45·134 (1973 & Supp. 1981).
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powers, 287 including the power to withhold water service because of delinquencies, forfeit water rights for defaults, resell or otherwise dispose of
such forfeited water, allocate and re-allocate the use of water to lands
within the districts, transfer water from lands to which it had been allocated to other lands within the district, 288 and fix rates at which water
which is not allotted to specific lands is sold or leased. 289 In setting rates
for both the allocated and surplus water the directors have wide discretion. 290 They may establish different units within the district and fix a
different value per acre-foot in the respective units. 291 The statute requires
that rates be equitable, although not necessarily equal or uniform for like
classes of service. 292
The rights to individual water service in conservancy districts unlike
that in irrigation districts derives from the execution of a voluntary waterservice contract between the individual landowner and the district. 298 In
Colorado, the water right attaches to the land described in the contract,
yet the water use itself is not limited to that parcel. 294
Legislatures created water conservancy districts in response to the need
to foster cooperation among irrigators and municipal water users, and
thus detailed statutory provisions allow for the protection and promotion
of both water uses. 2911 Some individual conservancy districts, however,
may serve municipal or agricultural interests exclusively. 298
In general, water conservancy legislation, with its provisions for voluntary participation in districts, and cooperation among municipal and agricultural interests, seems more carefully tailored than irrigation district
legislation. In this regard, water conservancy districts are better able to
meet the needs of varied land and water uses. The provisions of these
statutes, however, do not always fully describe the current water conditions and policies operating within the district, and some revision may be

287. Id.
288. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-134 (1973).
289. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-45-118 (1973).
290. See Matthews v. Tri-County Water Conservancy Dist., 613 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1980) in which
the Colorado Supreme Court held that such rate setting was not subject to regulation by the Colorado
Public Utilities Commission or County Boards of Commissioners.
291. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-45-118 (1973). Water within each unit must be assessed on a uniform value per acre foot. Id.
292. Id.
293. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 50.
294. Id.
295. See Kelly, supra note 373, at 434. See supra note 279 (both interests must be represented in
formation procedures).
296. See COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-45-109(3)(c) (1973) (individual districts need serve only one of
the statutory purposes).
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in order. 297 Other provisions may possibly be cured or updated through
liberal construction to preserve district purposes.
3.

The Arizona
(MCWCD)

Multi-County

Water

Conservation

District

While water conservancy district legislation in general permits districts
to extend into several counties, Arizona has created a special MultiCounty Water Conservation District (MCWCD). 298 The only such district formed to date is the Central Arizona Water Conservation District
which was designed to secure repayment to the federal government for
the Central Arizona Project (CAP). 299
An MCWCD is formed upon the filing of a petition with the Arizona
Director of Water Resources,soo who conducts a formation hearing.soi If
the director determines that "the public convenience and welfare will be
served by the establishment of the district," he must declare the district
formed. sos A board of directors elected by residents, not just landowners,
of each member county governs the MCWCD after formation.sos
The powers of the MCWCD reflect its main purpose of serving as a
repayment entity for federal projects.so• The District Board has the authority to enter contracts with other water districts, but it has no power to
allocate ,the waters of the CAP. 8011 Congress has reserved this allocation
authority to the Secretary of the Interior.sos
Because the MCWCD is primarily a repayment entity, the financing
provisions of its statute are of special importance. Unlike other irrigation
districts, the MCWCD levies an annual ad valorem assessment on all assessed property within its boundaries.so7 The assessments and charges for
the water delivered are supposed to repay those costs associated with the
CAP allocated to the district by the federal government.s08
Unlike an irrigation district, the MCWCD enjoys little local autonomy.

297. See Leshy, supra note 4, at n.90.
298. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-2601 to -2634 (Supp. 1981-1982).
299. See K. DE COOK, supra note 247, at 187.
300. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-2604 (Supp. 1981-1982). This petition may be filed by the
Boards of Supervisors of three or more counties or by a designated number of state electors. Id.
301. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-2605 (Supp. 1981-1982).
302. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 45-2605 (Supp. 1981-1982). The director's determination is subject to review by the state supreme court. Id.
303. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-2608 to -2609(8) (Supp. 1981-1982).
304. ARIZ. REV ... STAT. ANN.§ 45.-2612 (Supp. 1981-1982).
305. Id. § 45-2616 (Supp. 1981-1982).
306. 43 u.s.c. § 1524 (1976).
307. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-2614 (Supp. 1981-1982).
308. Id. § 45-2613 (Supp. 1981-1982).
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This lack of social control results from the district's primary purpose, to
serve as a repayment entity for a large federal project. The Secretary of
the Interior exercises primary supervision over MCWCD actions. 309
The MCWCD exemplifies the usefulness of the special district structure to meet changing environmental concerns and water uses. For example, in order to deal with increased urbanization of its lands, the statutory
structure empowers the District to contract with water users for the delivery of the water. 310 These contracts may be with municipal corporations,
political subdivisions, and irrigation districts; they are, however, subject to
the provisions of federal reclamation law, the Secretary's oversight, and
the terms of the repayment contract between the district and the
Secretary. 811

V.

DISTRICTS AS WATER MANAGERS

The legislatures of the Western states clearly anticipated some water
management role for the districts they created. This role has never been
precisely defined, however. While districts may exercise power over certain transfers of water rights and over the rationing of water, individual
water rights and statutory apportionment schemes may limit district powers. This section discusses the interplay between district and individual
water rights, the statutory apportionment schemes, and the role which
districts may play in the transfer of water rights and rationing of water.

A. District and Individual Water Rights
Untangling the web of water rights involves inspection of historical
state water appropriation law, examination of the current water uses, and
analysis of the entities which control original and supplemental water.
Generally, state laws, which govern the appropriation and use of water,
apply to individuals, private organizations, and public institutions such as
irrigation and conservancy districts. 811 The relationship of the water
rights of the district to those of the individual user within the district
historically took one of three forms. The district might hold the formal
title to the water right with the users having a beneficial ownership or
other interest in the right. 818 Alternatively, the individual users might
hold the legal as well as the equitable title and the district would only
309. 43 u.s.c. § 1524 ( 1976).
310. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-2613(8) (Supp. 1981-1982).
311. Id.
.
312. W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 238-40 (U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture Misc. Publ. No. 1206, 1972).
313. See Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 RocKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 475-76 (1960).
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hold title to the works. 814 Finally, in one state the district and individual
users held the appropriative right in common.s 111
There could be a combination of the above forms of water rights ownership where districts had not acquired title to all preexisting water rights
or where a district had purchased a commercial or mutual water company
subject to the company's preexisting contractual obligations. These preexisting rights would retain their priorities and appurtenance to specific
tracts.s 16
1.

Distribution of District Water

Where a district develops a new water supply, statutory provision controls the distribution of that water. The Wright Act, as well as the later
Wright-Bridgeford Act, provided for the distribution of water in direct
proportion to the ad valorem assessment of individual parcels of land, and
entitled landowners to transfer the water.s 17 Thus, the most valuable
lands were entitled to the largest water allotments. 818 In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, s19 the Court found that this type of
apportionment,
when followed by the right to assign the whole or any portion of the
waters apportioned to the landowner, operates with as near an approach to justice and equality as can be hoped for in such matters,
and does not alter the use from a public to a private one.allo

Despite this approving language the Supreme Court did not foreclose alternative apportionment methods, 811 and several states provided for substantially different methods of apportionment.s 21
The Wright-Bridgeford Act apportionment system perpetuated the disparity in the land development of the district. s23 Districts assessed lands
at a greater distance from water or water facilities at a lower rate, and

314. Id. at 476. See also Slosser v. Salt River Valley Canal Co., 7 Ariz. 376, 65 P. 332 (1901)
(holding that the sale of water is not a beneficial use and therefore a water company could not be an
appropriator).
315. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 79 P.2d 373
(1938).
316. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 48.
317. Wright-Bridgeford Act, ch. 189, § 18, 1897 Cal. Stat. 254, 259 (current version at CAL.
WATER CODE§ 22250 (West 1956)).
318. See supra note 95.
319. Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
320. Id. at 162.
321. See id. at 178.
322. See infra note 327 and accompanying text.
323. See Bull. No. 254, supra note 28, at 62.
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those lands correspondingly received a smaller amount of water, even
.when supplying more water would have increased the land's productivity.324 In effect, the Wright-Bridgeford Act method delivered water in
proportion to the value of the land prior to the receipt of water.
When states enacted legislation with apportionment provisions different
from those of the Wright-Bridgeford Act, 8211 they were careful to maintain the link between apportionment and assessment, because it was upon
this link that the constitutionality of the district format rested. 818 The variations from the Wright-Bridgeford Act made in several states seem to
reflect the efforts of state legislatures to accommodate the vested financial
interests of landowners wjth preexisting water supplies, and to design a
more efficient method of apportioning the water. The state statutes used
one of five methods of apportionment: (I) apportionment based on the
ratio of the assessed value of the land to the total assessments of the district, (2) equal allotments to each acre assessed, (3) an amount determined by the state engineer and district directors to represent the amount
of water that each parcel of land could put to beneficial use, (4) pro rata
apportionment among the assessed acres of the district; as long as, the
district took over the distribution of already appropriated water, it did not
abridge any prior appropriative rights, and (5) apportionment of an equitable quantity of water on the basis of beneficial use.m Several states also
provided that water which was acquired under contract with the United
States would be distributed pursuant to the contract provisions and federal law. 328
Contracts into which the district enters after its formation control the
distribution of water in water conservancy districts. 828 An entity may contract with a district for only as much water as will, in the judgment of the
board of directors, when added to the contracting entity's current supply
of water, maintain "an adequate supply" for that entity. 880
This statutory language grants the water conservancy district broad
power to shape water use throughout its boundaries. The apportionment is

324. Id.
325. For example in Utah, the statute, unlike the Wright-Bridgeford Act, vested discretion in the
state water engineer to apportion district water. This discretion seems not to raise constitutional questions, however, because the engineer's apportionment then formed the basis of the assessment. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-7-18 (1980). See supra note 155.
326. Circ. No. 934, supra note 7, at 51; Misc. Publ. No. 103, supra note 96, at 94-97.
327. Id.
328. Id. See also Comment, Reclamation Subsidies and Their Present Day Impact, 1982 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 499.
329. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-123 to -125 (1973).
330. This is just one of the water conservation district's broad powers over water distribution and
allocation. See also COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-34-134 (1973) (additional water powers).
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not tied to the assessed value of the property, or any rigid pro rata standard, but may vary with the needs of the individual user. Nor is there any
requirement that the water apportioned must be directly tied to any specific parcel of land because water can be allotted to a municipality or
irrigation district. These entities can then apportion the water in response
to local needs.
2.

Transfers of Water Rights

The Wright-Bridgeford Act allowed landowners to transfer their water
allotments to any tract within the district's boundaries. 331 This transfer
right may have been initially designed by the California Legislature to
appease landowners whose lands were included in the district but who had
previously developed sufficient water supplies. 332 Thus, even though the
Wright-Bridgeford Act did not originally provide for the exclusion of
these lands, by allowing landowners to lease water allotments, the Act
enabled landowners to recover the costs of the assessments, and put water
to beneficial use.
States which did not allow landowners to transfer their water allotments usually provided for other forms of compensation. 333 Districts
might give landowners an equitable credit in reducing their assessments
because of reduced water needs 334 or in some cases, districts might exempt landowners who had already developed sufficient water supplies
from compulsory inclusion of their lands in the district. 3311
The issue of transfer becomes more important as lands within an irrigation district become increasingly urban. 338 Individual tracts no longer
under irrigation may not need a full allotment of water and landowners
may desire to transfer their rights. The ability of individuals and districts
to effect these transfers reflects to some degree the flexibility of the irrigation district to meet changing needs.
Although there are varied impediments to transfer of water within district boundaries, 337 to the extent districts have the ability to influence or

331. See Misc. Publ. No. I 03, supra note 96, at 95-96.
332. See supra notes 114-15.
333. See Misc. Publ. No. I 03, supra note 96, at 13.
334. Id.
335. For example, in Arizona lands already under an existing system of irrigation would be exempt from inclusion if the works had been operating one year and had actually delivered water to
25% of the area. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1503 (1956).
336. See FINAL REPORT NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION 260 (1973).
337. One commentator has identified three major obstacles to the transfer of appropriative water
rights: (I) federal reclamation laws forbidding individuals and districts receiving project water to
transfer water rights, (2) state laws forbidding transfer, and (3) state laws which make the water
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control transfers, they have significant power to shape water use both
within and without their boundaries. For example, districts can use transfer powers to promote conservation. 388 Districts can encourage landowners
to use agricultural methods which require less water and then transfer the
remainder of their appropriation to the district itself. In return, the district could reduce the costs of irrigation to these landowners by selling the
surplus water to higher paying users such as municipalities and industry.
In addition, the district could overcome landowner fears that conservation
will permanently reduce the amount of their water right by contract provisions granting conserving landowners a preference right to the purchase
of surplus water.
Statutory reforms which would give the districts clearer title to the
water within their boundaries would enhance the ability of districts to
· effect conservation policies. When districts hold title to all or most of the
water within their boundaries, the complications and costs of internal
transfers are greatly reduced.aa 9
The law governing transfers of water from within districts for use
outside district boundaries is extremely confused.a•o In addition to the impediments confronting transfers within district boundaries, such external
transfers may violate state law, and seem to contradict the fundamental
purpose of a district to provide water for its lands.
Even if districts are unable to effect external transfers, they have sometimes been given the ability to affect water use outside their boundaries.
For example, along with water users' associations, Arizona irrigation districts and the AIPD hold an absolute veto power over applications for
transfer of any water rights within any watersheds in which they have
water rights.an This unguided veto gives districts the power to promote
the water interests of their landowners or of the districts themselves, without any state supervision.
The veto power held by districts and by the private water users' associations raises issues about the propriety of these institutions making
independent decisions affecting state water policy. The statute provides
for the state Director of Water Resources to evaluate and approve or deny
applications for transfer.au Allowing districts and water users' associa-

rights appurtenant to the land, prohibiting their transfer. C. MEYERS & R. PowNER, MARKET
TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES 17-18 (Legal
Study No. 4 for the National Water Commission, 1971 ).
338. Id. at appendix I, p. A 1-14.
339. Id. at appendix I, p. Al-15.
340. Id. at 25.
341. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-172 (Supp. 1981-1982).
342. Id.
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tions to veto the transfer duplicates the evaluation of the director. In fact,
the district or association veto may preempt the director's decision because permits for transfer cannot be issued over a district's or a,ssociation's veto. The district or associations might even veto a water transfer
which might otherwise be consistent with express state water policy, even
where the transferee and the transferor are outside the district and have
no voice in its management. 343 The district can exercise its veto power, in
other words, without regard to state policy concerning the relative value
of uses. 344
In order to promote consistent state water policy, the independent vote
of districts and associations should be restricted. The district 'veto should
be subjected to override by the state water director, 3411 or similar state
oversight. This would allow transfers to occur in response to market conditions, but under restrictions which protect both the district's legitimate
concerns and the larger public interest. 348

B.

Water Rationing

Another important area of water management is the ability of districts
to ration water during shortages. The statutes usually employ the general
but largely unhelpful guideline that during a shortage a district may distribute available water to achieve the best interests of all parties
concerned. 347
The ability to ration may have an increasingly important role in water
management in the future. Yet district statutes typically do not adequately define the term shortage. 348 Conceivably, available water might

343. See, e.g., Salt River Valley Water Users Association v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411
F.2d 201 (1966). In Kovacovich, the defendant had saved sufficient water through conservation to
apply water to a second parcel of land. The Water Users' Association objected to this transfer. The
court held that the water was appurtenant to the land for which it had initially been appropriated,
and therefore application of the water to a second parcel was a transfer subject to the plaintiffs' veto.
Because the court found the plaintiffs unharmed by the transfer, its holding indicates that Arizona
law affords a blanket veto of transfers within the watershed to water users associations and districts.
344. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-147 (Supp. 1981-1982) (setting forth priorities for
the director to give to competing uses).
345. Id.
346. A determination by the state water director is subject to judicial review. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 45-156 (Supp. 1981-1982). Provisions for judicial review of such decisions help safeguard the
interests of both individuals not represented in district management, and state water policy. See
Bruff, Judicial Review in local Government law: A Reappraisal, 60 MINN. L. REV. 669 (19751976). In New Mexico elimination of the Water District veto of transfers has facilitated the implementation of state water policy by the state water engineer. See Comment, Water law-legal Impediments to Transfers of Water rights, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 433, 440 ( 1967).
347. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-1589 (1956).
348. See, e.g.. CAL. WATER CooE § 22252.3 (Supp. 1982) (which defines shortage as an amount
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be sufficient for domestic uses but be inadequate to meet agricultural demands. At issue then would be whether a shortage triggering the district's
rationing powers actually exists. Further, if such a shortage existed the
district could allocate available water in disregard of general state water
policy.s•e
Legislatures should amend state statutes governing district rationing
powers to require consideration of state water policy in the rationing decision. For example, rationing plans should incorporate the priority of water
uses established in state statutes. 8110
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Wright Act gave the Western states a blueprint for a governmental special district designed to meet the objective of providing new or supplemental irrigation water. Legislatures first modified the formula in response to early district failures and abuses of bonding authority. The
statutory format was later adapted to enlarge some of the basic functions
of the district, especially to supply electrical power or water for municipal
and industrial uses.
State legislatures have also altered the district structure to embody
somewhat different approaches to water supplies and distribution. The
newer and larger conservancy districts represent adaptations which provide expressly for the coordination of both agricultural and urban needs.
Similarly, financing structures have shifted from the special assessments
for special benefits to more generalized taxing power combined with special assessments voluntarily assumed.
The modern irrigation district and the more sophisticated improvement
and conservancy districts have become central suppliers and managers of
water in an increasingly complex market. As the demands for municipal
and industrial water continue to expand, the political and legal ability of
districts either to satisfy or resist that demand becomes increasingly important. These pressures have placed into controversy many of the characteristics of irrigation districts.
In Ball v. James, 81u the Supreme Court upheld the Arizona AIPD's
acreage based voting scheme as constitutional, and in doing so answered
some of the questions about the limits on irrigation district authority. The

of water determined by the board to be "inadequate to provide water in a quantity furnished in years
of average precipitation.") Id.
349. Cf supra notes 343, 344 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of districts to veto
water transfers in disregard of state water policy).
350. See W. HUTCHINS, supra note 312, at 400-36.
351. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
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majority opinion in Ball v. James tracks the rationale of the landmark
decision in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley.m The fundamental
approach of the two opinions in strikingly similar; both refuse to question
seriously the judgment of state legislatures in creating governmental entities to respond to the specific problems of water supply in the arid
West. 3113 The main problem with the Court's analysis is that it focuses on
the historical and statutory purposes of the district and may ignore the
actual operating reality. In Ball v. James, the Court frames the analysis
of the district's acreage-based voting structure in terms of the narrow and
specialized statutory purposes of the district, sidestepping any real recognition of the district's significant power operations and governmental
characteristics. 3114
This type of analysis is not confined to constitutional questions alone.
Courts reviewing many aspects of district structures or actions tend to
look to the statutory authority of the district and uphold district actions
unless clearly excessive. In light of this kind of court review, the districts'
statutory provisions become the most important factor in assessing the
role districts will play in water management. If legislatures do not amend
these statutes to reflect current land and water uses and to provide definitive procedures or substantive standards for resolving conflicts between
water uses, judicial review of district activities will not provide a vehicle
to achieve reforms which may be necessary: such as providing more adequate representation of urban needs or better means to resolve conflicts.
These issues were underscored by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Ball v. James. The concurring opinion emphasized the ability of
states to experiment with political structures to meet the novel problems
of local communities, 31111 and concluded that state legislatures are the best
institutions to design and subsequently modify the powers of such special
districts. 3118
This comment has traced some of the historical alterations in the district statutes. In the past, when districts have created issues of general
concern such as bond defaults, legislatures have taken steps to provide
additional state supervision and guidance to protect the public interest.
When districts could benefit the public by producing electrical power or

352. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
353. Both opinions begin with a discussion of the conditions of the arid West. Compare Fallbrook
Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 151-53 (1896) with Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 357-60 (1981).
See also Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (opinion
begins with a detailed historical analysis of Western water conditions and district development).
354. 451 U.S. 355, 385 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 373-74 ( 1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
356. Id.
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draining water logged lands, legislative action has given them the
authority.
To the extent statutes governing districts still retain their historic emphasis on serving agriculture, questions can be raised about their continuing vitality when, in many areas of the West, rapid urbanization is replacing or restricting continued agricultural operations. In many situations,
especially with respect to the ability of districts to shape water usage, the
time has come for legislatures to consider modifying district acts once
again. Such modification would, just as the original statutes once did, be
aimed at better meeting the needs of the communities they serve.
Lenni Beth Benson

